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Abstract

Public schools are afflicted by a litany of ailments ranging from the methodological to the
practical. Public schools operate on a conflicted educational philosophy, are rife with
inefficiencies, and result in educational monopolies. A state tuition tax credit system is
the most advantageous policy option available in regards to education reform and school
choice initiatives. This paper will examine some of the 11 state tuition tax credit
programs currently in operation as well as other school choice options, and identify
problems inherent in the public school system. State tuition tax credits are a superior
educational policy option as compared with the public education system, because they
allow free market pressures to reform inefficiencies in the public school system, and
allow private schools an increased ability to compete. Other positive effects include
increased parental choice, higher academic achievement, increased graduation rates, and
decreased strains on state budgets. This paper will attempt to prove that state tuition tax
credits are the most efficient and effective school choice policy in use today and should
be adopted by the remaining 39 states.

STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS
State Tuition Tax Credits: A School Choice Policy Recommendation
School choice programs are proliferating at a rapid rate. The Wall Street Journal
dubbed 2011 the “Year of School Choice,” as thirteen states passed major education
reforms.1 State tuition tax credits are one of many school choice policy options available
to states across America.
Introduced in the late 1990s in the context of controversial voucher programs,
state tuition tax credits were proposed as a popular education option consistent with state
constitutional authority.2 Eleven states have since adopted some form of state tuition tax
credit program.3 Despite variations in policy particulars, the basic function of the
program allows individuals and corporations to take a portion of their state taxes and
transfer them to nonprofit school tuition organizations (STOs). The STOs will directly
issue scholarships to K-12 students. Some programs are means tested, some are capped at
a certain dollar amount, and others exist to target specific socioeconomic groups. The
unifying feature of state tuition tax credit programs is the tax credit; individuals or
corporations receive a state income tax credit for donations made to approved charitable
organizations, the vehicle through which assistance is provided for children to attend
private schools.4 The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Winn (2011), upheld Arizona’s state
1

“The Year of School Choice,” The Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2011.

2

Nicole Stelle Garnett, “A Winn for Educational Pluralism,” 121 Yale Law Journal
Online 31 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/05/26/garnett.html (accessed 3/4/2013)
referencing Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 Supreme Court Review 1, 15-18.
3

National Conference of State Legislatures, “Tuition Tax Credits,”
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/school-choice-scholarship-tax-credits.aspx (accessed
3/4/2013). States include Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
4

Garnett, “A Winn for Educational Pluralism,” p. 31. Some programs, like the one in
Arizona, allow both individuals and corporations to receive tax credit.
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tuition tax credit system as constitutional. This paper will attempt to prove that state
tuition tax credits are the most efficient and effective school choice policy in use today
and should be adopted by the remaining 39 states.5
Educational Philosophy
State tuition tax credit policies demonstrate a clear advantage over other
competing education options in that they recognize the nature of education as a religious
enterprise. Noah Webster, widely considered to be the father of American education,
defined education in his 1828 Dictionary of the English Language in the following
manner:
The bringing up, as of a child, instruction; formation of manners.
Education comprehends all that series of instruction and discipline which
is intended to enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form
the manners and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in their future
stations. To give children a good education in manners, arts and science, is
important; to give them a religious education is indispensable; and an
immense responsibility rests on parents and guardians who neglect these
duties.6
While education is typically reduced to a transmission of data and scientific facts about
the world, Webster defines education as including instruction in truth, morality, ethics,
manners, attitudes, habits, character and responsibility.
Public schools, on the other hand, were originally instituted and designed to be a
social force. Herbert Schlossberg argues this point, claiming that public schools were

5

6

Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 1 (2011).

Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1828, (West Valley
City: Waking Lion Press, 2010) 246.
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designed to solve problems of political, economic, social, and criminal derivation.7
Moreover, education is inherently religious in nature. Even those who claim to educate
from an anti-religious perspective elevate secularism as their religious philosophy.
Learning cannot exist in an ideological vacuum, as presuppositions pervade all
educational methodologies and philosophies. Education cannot be value-free, because
any hierarchy of values is a religious system.8 Furthermore, Schlossberg argues that
education is unique in that it operates in a framework of assumptions, not assertions.
Assumptions bypass the critical faculty and function as powerful ideological tools for
those who receive and integrate arguments without actively engaging the preceding
assumption—a common phenomenon in many public school classrooms.9
This paper also assumes that civil government should be limited in its scope. As
Justice Jackson articulated in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnett in 1943, “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”10 Justice
Jackson establishes an important premise here: the government shall not establish or
prescribe matters of opinion. When juxtaposed with the nature of education established
above, these two premises cast light upon the issue of government involvement in
education. While that question is ripe for analysis in another paper, this discussion will
7

Herbert Schlossberg, Idols of Destruction: The Conflict of Christian Faith and American
Culture (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1990), 209.
8

Ibid., 210.

9

Ibid.

10

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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focus on state tuition tax credits as a policy option inclusive of the more fundamental
assumption that civil authority is limited, and does not encompass liberty of conscience,
the heart of education.
Constitutionality: Arizona v. Winn
A comprehensive evaluation of a policy must include a discussion of its
constitutionality, a gateway consideration that ought to govern the conceptualization and
implementation of all policy options. Furthermore, any policy’s ability to survive a
challenge of constitutionality is central to its success.
Arizona first passed its tuition tax credit program in 1997.11 It was designed to
promote school choice at large, but proponents argued that it would prove to be of special
value to children from low-income families who traditionally attend poor public
schools.12 The policy has two tax credit schemes which cater to both individuals and
corporations if they contribute to school tuition organizations (STOs). Dollar-for-dollar
tax credits are available up to $500 for individuals, or up to $1,000 for joint filers.
Arizona’s program does not establish a maximum tax credit ceiling for corporations—
they are allowed to contribute up to the equivalent of their entire corporate tax liability
and receive it back in dollar-for-dollar tax credits. However, Arizona has capped total tax
credits offered, distributing up to $17.28 million to corporations on a first-come, first
serve basis.13 Four Arizona residents recently challenged the constitutionality of the state

11

Ronald J. Hansen, “High Court Upholds Arizona’s Tuition Tax-Credit Program,” The
Arizona Republic, April 5, 2011. See A.R.S. 43-1089 (for individuals) and A.R.S. 43-1183 (for
corporations).
12

13

Ibid.

The $17.28 million cap is from FY 2010. The cap will increase 20% annually. A
concise description of both individual and corporate provisions in the Arizona program can be
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tuition tax credit system and the Supreme Court heard the case in Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn.14
At issue in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Kathleen M. Winn,
et al. was Article III standing, which the Court held taxpayers in Arizona lacked under
Flast v. Cohen (1968).15 The majority opinion,16 written by Justice Kennedy, held that the
only taxpayers with standing under Flast are those contesting direct monetary outlays on
First Amendment Establishment Cause grounds. The majority held that Flast does not
extend standing to Arizona’s taxpayers objecting to tax credit provisions such as provided
in Arizona’s tuition tax credit scheme, which awarded tax credits to individuals and
corporations for contributions made to STOs.17 The majority concluded that:
This Court has rejected the general proposition that an individual who has
paid taxes has a “continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring that
those funds are not used by the Government in a way that violates
the Constitution.”18

found at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/school-choice-scholarship-tax-credits.aspx
(accessed 3/4/2013).
14

Arizona v. Winn, 563 U.S. 1 (2011).

15

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Florance Flast joined several others in suit against
Wilbur Cohen, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The suit argued that spending
government funds on religious schools violated the First Amendment’s opposition to the
establishment of religion. In Flast, in order to determine standing, the court articulated a two
pronged test. First, the taxpayer must be the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the
tax. Second, the taxpayer must “show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power and not simply that
the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. 1, § 8.” at 102-103.
16

Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas all joined in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Scalia also wrote a brief concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined.
17

See Arizona Revised Statute Annotated § 43-1089 (2011), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/43/01089.html (accessed 3/4/2013).
18

Arizona v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 at 1442-1443. Quoting Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587.
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On the other hand, Justice Kagan argued in her dissent that Flast affords standing to
Arizona taxpayers, grounding her assertion in the academic doctrine of “tax expenditure
analysis,” and concluding that “targeted tax breaks…are just spending under a different
name.”19
Tax Expenditure Analysis
The tax expenditure analysis relied upon by Justice Kagan in her dissent is weak
for three reasons. First, tools of constitutional analysis “must be reasonable, coherent and
principled” in their guidance to the courts, and tax expenditure analysis does not pass this
test. Second, “the quandaries of defining tax expenditures arise not simply at the margins,
but rather at the very core of the concept.” 20 Because the concept’s definition is largely
nebulous, it would be unwise to create an exception allowing for tax expenditure analysis
to be used here. Third, the conclusions drawn by Justice Kagan made on the basis of this
analysis violate the nature of private property by enlarging the state’s ability to count all
income as government property, or monies.
Concerning the difference between expenditures and tax breaks that tax
expenditure analysis attempts to negate, the Court had to determine whether or not direct
government spending and tax subsidies were the same. The question of equivalency,
particularly in regards to direct public outlays and tax subsidies for constitutional

19

Edward A. Zelinsky, “Winn and the Inadvisibility of Constitutionalizing Tax
Expenditure Analysis,” 121. Yale Law Journal Online 25 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/05/26/zelinsky.html (accessed 3/4/2013). Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1452;
1456 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor in her dissent.
20

Ibid., 28.
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purposes, is something the Court is well versed in confronting.21 “However, Justice
Kagan’s dissent in Winn is only the second time that tax expenditure doctrine has
formally played such an explicit, prominent role in the Court’s decision making.”
According to Edward A. Zelinsky, tax expenditure analysis has two key provisions:
“…(1) that tax deductions, credits, exemptions and exclusions can be divided into
‘normative’ tax provisions necessary to implement the tax and ‘expenditure’ provisions
which deviate from the normative tax, and (2) that such tax expenditures are equivalent to
direct monetary outlays.” Tax expenditure analysis has been enormously successful in
terms of legal scholarship and legal education, and yet some of its core flaws have never
been resolved. Zelinsky points out that tax expenditure analysis provides no bright-line
standard or principle by which one can classify tax provisions as normative or otherwise,
and thus the distinction between normative provisions necessary for the implementation
of the tax and special provisions treated as expenditures is only a pipedream.22
Justice Kagan contends that “[C]ash grants and targeted tax breaks are a means of
accomplishing the same government objective—to provide financial support to select
individuals or organizations.”23 Though this assumption may be true, she employs it to
prove that Arizona taxpayers have standing.
21

Ibid., 26. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, “Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?” 112 Harvard Law Review 379 (1998) He discusses four
cases from the mid-1990s, where the Court confronted the question of whether tax benefits are
direct expenditures.
22

Ibid. For a seminal discussion of tax expenditure analysis, see Stanley S Surrey, “Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures,” 83 Harvard Law Review 705, 711 (1970). Stanley Surrey is credited
with the creation of tax expenditure analysis in 1967 when he was Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy.
23

Arizona v. Winn, 23.
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Taxpayers who oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to protest
whether that aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other. Either
way, the government has financed the religious activity. And so either
way, taxpayers should be able to challenge the subsidy.24
If Justice Kagan is correct, then it must also be true that the state has a more basic and
fundamental claim to an individual’s property than the individual does, justifying broader
state claims to private property. The Constitution, on the other hand, assumes individuals
have a more basic and fundamental right to property than the state, via the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, Justice Kagan’s application of tax expenditure analysis is imprudent
at best.
Religious Neutrality
Quoting Flast in her dissent, Justice Kagan harkens back to the basis of the
Establishment Clause: “[O]ne of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the
Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power
would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.”25 In
essence, Justice Kagan is asserting that tuition tax credits, which “come out of what
[citizens] otherwise would be legally obligated to pay the state,”26 will favor one religion
over another or support religion in general because to fund education participants will
divert their money to religious or parochial schools. Given the nature of tuition tax
credits, Kagan’s argument breaks down. Placing choice in the hands of individuals,
especially parents, as opposed to the state, does not result in state sponsorship of religion,
but instead, prevents it. This is true for two reasons. First, if individuals are allowed to

24

Arizona v. Winn, 2.

25

Ibid., 39.

26

Ibid., 36.
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choose where their children are educated with their own money, the state is not
sponsoring religion in any way—the individual is—and the First Amendment explicitly
protects the individual’s liberty of conscience relative to religious matters, which cannot
be separated from education. Justice Kennedy references this logic in his majority
opinion:
When the government declines to impose a tax…there is no such connection
between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment. Any financial injury
remains speculative…. And awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other
citizens to retain control over their funds in accordance with their own
consciences.27
Second, Kagan’s argument assumes that all property belongs to the state. However, if it is
true that personal property belongs to the individual, then property retained by the
individual and spent by the individual for his own purposes is not a state sponsorship of
religion or any other activity or philosophy. Untaxed money never enters the state
treasuries, and thus, there is no state establishment of religion, and consequently no
violation of the First Amendment. Kagan’s argument lacks constitutional weight.
Parental Choice
Given the inseparable relationship between education and worldview, parental
choice in education becomes paramount. If the government is given control over
education funding, it then wields an educational monopoly. On the other hand, if parents
can choose where their children attend school with their own funds, they can preserve
their right to raise and educate their children. Tuition tax credits broaden the educational
choice of parents and other interested participants by providing them with a tax credit to
sponsor a child in a participating private school. Thus, the close relationship between

27

Winn, 14.
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parenting, education and religion is respected, as power is retained by those who have the
greatest interest in children—the parents.
Academic Achievement vs. National Standards
State policymakers have an option: either they will comply with Washington’s
call for national curricula or they will retain control over their own state’s educational
achievement standards, and design, tailor, and implement them in ways which reflect the
standards of parents and members of the community. A state tuition tax credit system
would contribute to the latter by creating educational opportunities through private
investments.
The Common Core State Standards Initiative (CCSSI) is the most recent push by
the federal government to increase the Department of Education’s (DE) role in
education.28 Following in the national policy context of No Child Left Behind (NCLB),29
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),30 and Race to the Top (RTT)31
programs, CCSSI is intended to incentivize state governments to align their educational

28

CCSSI was an outcome of the Obama Administration’s joint program with the National
Governor’s Association (NGA) and Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO). Further
coverage of CCSSI can be found in Sandra Stotsky, “Common Core Standards’ Devastating
Impact on Literary Study and Analytical Thinking,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3800,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/12/questionable-quality-of-the-common-coreenglish-language-arts-standards (accessed 3/4/2013).
29

NCLB was passed in the first George W. Bush Administration. Pub.L. 107-110, enacted
January 8, 2002.
30

ARRA was passed in the first Obama Administration. Pub.L. 111-5, enacted February

17, 2009.
31

The $4.35 billion in the RTT fund is provided for in the ARRA.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013).
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standards with national ones.32 Nevertheless, such programs are ineffective in increasing
academic achievement, and states should be cautious to create such a relationship for
three reasons.
First, the Constitution denies the federal government authority over educational
matters, and the enumeration of Congress’s powers in Article 1 Section 8 reflects this
prohibition. Second, experts agree that national standards lack requisite academic rigor.
Former U.S. Department of Education official and mathematician Ze’ev Wurman finds
the Common Core standards particularly deficient.
[T]he Common Core mathematics standards fail on clarity and rigor
compared to better state standards and to those of high achieving
countries. They do not expect algebra to be taught in grade 8 and … their
promise of college readiness rings hollow. Its college-readiness standards
are below the admission requirement of most four-year state colleges.33
Second, Sandra Stotsky, a University of Arkansas professor and member of the
Common Core standards validation committee for English Language Arts, finds that
national standards are defective methodologically. CCSSI was designed by “[the] same
special interests that gave us the poor states’ standards they were designed to replace.”34
Third, the Brookings Institute forecasts that proposed national standards will have
“little to no impact on student learning” due to the fact that in-state performance variation
is so high:
32Stotsky,

“Common Core Standards’ Devastating Impact on Literary Study and
Analytical Thinking.”
33

Ze’ev Wurman and W. Stephen Wilson, “The Common Core Math Standards,”
Education Next, vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer 2012), http://educationnext.org/the-common-core-mathstandards/ (accessed 3/4/2013).
34

Sandra Stotsky, “How to Avoid Dumbing High Schools Down in Reauthorizing
ESEA,” Jay P. Greene’s blog, February 22, 2011, http://jaypgreene.com/tag/sandra-stotsky/
(accessed 3/4/2013).
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Consider Massachusetts and Mississippi, a state [sic] with low scores but
not at the very bottom. Their NAEP [National Assessment of Educational
Progress] means differ by 25 points. Every state, including Massachusetts
and Mississippi, has a mini-Massachusetts and Mississippi contrast within
its own borders. That variation will go untouched by common state
standards…. The empirical evidence suggests that the Common Core will
have little effect on American students’ achievement. The nation will have
to look elsewhere for ways to improve its schools.35
Academic Achievement
Coupled with parental rights and property rights, academic achievement is one of
the most important elements by which a state tuition tax credit system can be judged.
Parents who send their children to independent schools consistently indicate that
academic quality is their primary concern.36 Furthermore, this priority is not confined to
educational districts known for high academic achievement or high income. A report
presented by John J. Convey at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational
Research Association found that the majority of the 11,000 Catholic-school parents in
Washington, D.C. cited the “academic program” as their most important reason for
choosing a Catholic school.37 State tuition tax credits increase independent school options
for many families, and if independent schools produce higher academic achievement,

35

Tom Loveless, “How Well Are American Students Learning?” Brookings Institution
2012 Brown Center Report on American Education, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2012/0216_brown_education_loveless/0216_
brown_education_loveless.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013).
36

See Edith McArthur, Kelly W. Colopy, and Beth Schlaline, “Use of School Choice
Educational Policy Issues, Statistical Perspectives [Revised],” National Center for Education
Statistics, 1995; ERIC document no. ED387859.
37

John J. Convey, “Parental Choice of Catholic Schools as a Function of Religion, Race,
and Family Income,” Research report presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA, April 16-20 1986, 5; ERIC document no.
ED269542.

15

STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS
then state tuition tax credits are the best policy option that will correspondingly increase
academic achievement.
James Coleman, a sociologist, empirical researcher, and president of the
American Sociological Association, completed studies in the late 1980s which indicated
that student achievement in Catholic high schools, when controlled for the influence of
family background, is equivalent to approximately one grade increase as compared to
public schools. Public school students showed two years of growth in four years of
schooling, while Catholic students demonstrated nearly three years of learning in the
same amount of time.38 The studies of Anthony Bryk, one of America’s most noted
educational researchers and ninth president of the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, indicate discrete differences in mathematics performance
between Catholic and public schools. The advantage offered by Catholic schools is
equivalent to 3.2 years of additional learning over the course of a high school education,
after accounting for family background, social class, and race/ethnicity.39 The National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports that in 2011, 8th graders in private schools
outscored their public school counterparts by 13 points in mathematics, 15 points in
science, 15 points in writing, and 18 points in reading.40 The difference in achievement
38

J. S. Coleman, & T. Hoffer, Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of
Communities, (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
39

Anthony S. Bryk, Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland, Catholic Schools and the
Common Good, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 262-263. Measurements
concerning student achievement relative to mathematics are particularly relevant because
mathematics has been found to be the subject least affected by home-related factors and most
influenced by classroom instruction.
40

National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Report,
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/private_school_quick_data.asp (accessed 3/4/2013).
The most recent science scores available are from 2009. Scores were out of 500 points in
mathematics and reading and 300 points in writing and science.

16

STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS
between public and private schools is stark, and state tuition tax credits are likely to
improve academic achievement among students who are able to attend private schools.
Academic Attainment
Dr. Patrick J. Wolf, who holds an Endowed Chair in School Choice Education
Reform, conducted an evaluation of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP)
that is particularly relevant to the issue of academic attainment. The OSP found that 82%
of students offered scholarships to private schools graduated, while 70% of students
denied such scholarships graduated, resulting in a 12% higher graduation rate among the
former group.41 Those who benefited from the scholarships, evidenced a 21% increase in
graduation rates in comparison to whose who did not. With this, 91% of students who
received a scholarship in the Washington, D.C. OSP graduated from high school. The
survey divided participants into two statistically similar groups. The treatment group was
offered scholarships, while the control group was not.42 The treatment group numbered
1,387 students, all of which were offered scholarships, while 921 students were in the
control group and were not offered scholarships.43
The results of Dr. Wolfe’s study are considered reliable as The Heritage
Foundation regarded its methodology as a “gold standard” for reliability.44 Lindsey

41

Lindsey Burke, “Study: DC Opportunity Scholarship Program Benefits Participants,”
The Heartland Institute, June 25, 2010,
http://www.heartland.org/full/27877/Study_DC_Opportunity_Scholarship_Program_Benefits_Pa
rticipants.html (accessed 3/4/2013).
42

Ibid.

43

Ibid.

44

Lidsey M. Burke and Rachel Sheffield, “School Choice in America 2011: Educational
Opportunities Reaches New Heights”. Heritage Backgrounder No. 2597.
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Burke, a Will Skillman Fellow in Education at The Heritage Foundation quoted from Dr.
Patrick Wolf on the importance of academic attainment: “…high school graduation is the
‘Holy Grail of educational interventions in the inner city.’ Moreover, Wolf notes that
high school graduates live longer, earn higher wages, experience lower rates of
unemployment, and are less likely to be convicted of a crime. ‘If a program boosts the
graduation rate, and does nothing else, it’s a success.’”45 Varied school choice programs
of many forms have reliably and consistently produced increased graduation rates, and
state tuition tax credits promise to produce similar results.
The evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) was similar
to Dr. Wolf’s evaluation. John F. Witte led a team of researchers whose survey tracked
MPCP 9th graders and compared them to a carefully matched sample of 9th graders
enrolled in the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS).46 MPCP students were found to have
slightly higher rates of academic attainment given that more MPCP than MPS students
graduated from high school, and went onto and enroll in a four-year college. Witte’s
group of researchers also identified numerous other studies that support the value of high
school graduation. The Milwaukee report’s meta-evaluation indicated that increased
academic attainment results in regular employment, aversion to criminal and other

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/school-choice-in-america-2011-educationalopportunity-reaches-new-heights#_ftnref123 (accessed 3/4/2013).
45

46

Burke, “Study: DC Opportunity Scholarship Program Benefits Participants.”

Joshua M. Cowen, David J. Fleming, John F. Witte, and Patrick J. Wolf, “Student
Attainment and the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” March 2011,
http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/SCDP/Milwaukee_Eval/Report_24.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013).
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dysfunctional behavior, and increased personal income and savings.47 Furthermore, the
same meta-evaluation found that the attainment of a high school degree positively affects
life expectancy, overall health and health care, wealth accumulation, increased tax
revenues and economic development.
Competition in Education
Two important studies deserve consideration here relative to competition. First is
a study focused on The McKay Scholarship program in Florida, which indicated that
disabled students in the public school system benefited because of competition with a
voucher program. 48 The authors of the report state that “rather than being harmed, public

47

Ibid. 2. See also Ellen Meara, Seth Richards, and David Cutler, “The Gap Gets Bigger:
Changes in Mortality and Life Expectancy, By Education, 1981-2000,” 2008, Health Affairs, vol.
27, no 2; John S. Wirt, Susan P. Choy, Patrick Rooney, Stephen Provasnik, Anindita Sen and
Richard Tobin, “The Condition of Education” (NCES 2004-077); U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics; Washington D.C. Peter Muenning, “The economic value
of health gains associated with education interventions,” Manuscript prepared for the Equity
Symposium on The Social Costs of Inadequate Education at Teachers’ College, Columbia
University; Cecilia E. Rouse, “Labor market consequences of an inadequate education,” paper
prepared for the symposium on the Social Costs of Inadequate Education, Teachers’ College,
Columbia University; Cecilia E. Rouse, “Labor market consequences of an inadequate
education”; Pedro Carneiro, James J. Heckman, and Edward Vytlacil, “Understanding What
Instrumental Variables Estimate: Estimating Marginal and Average Returns to Education”
University of Chicago working paper; Jennifer Day and Eric Newburger, “The Big Payoff:
Educational Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings” US Census Bureau,
Washington D.C.; Clive Belfield and Henry Levin, “The Return on Investment for Improving
California’s High School Graduation Rate,” California Dropout Research Project, Santa Barbara,
California; Adriana Lleras-Muney, “The Relationship Between Education and Adult Morality in
the United States” The Review of Economic Studies, 72: 250; Clive Belfield and Henry Levin,
“High School Dropouts and the Economic Loses from Juvenile Crime in California,” California
Dropout Research Project. Santa Barbara, California.
48

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “The Effect of Special Education Vouchers on
Public School Achievement: Evidence From Florida's McKay Scholarship Program,” Manhattan
Institute Civic Report No. 52, April 2008, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_52.html
(accessed 3/4/2013).
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schools respond to the challenge of exposure to school choice by improving the education
they provide.”49
The second study consisted of a large compilation of studies collected by Greg
Forster, and from which he argues that private school choice inserts an element of
accountability into the educational formula, which uniquely predisposes public schools to
augment their academic performance given the parental option of choosing a competitive
private school if the public option is deemed unsatisfactory.50 Forster references nineteen
studies in support of this argument. Seventeen found that public schools improved in the
context of a voucher system, and one report demonstrated public school improvement
when competing with a tax credit scholarship program. Only one study found no visible
impact on public schools.51 Without private school choice options, the educational system
is insulated from market forces and disincentivized from achieving higher academic
performance. Nevertheless competition demonstrates that public schools can improve.
Additionally, public education transportation expenses have been steadily rising
over the past fifty years. According to statistics compiled by Andrew J. Coulson, from
1949-50 the annual cost of transportation was $184 per student, rising to $285 in 197778, and peaking at $420 in 1990-91.52 If public schools were able to increase efficiency
and decrease transportation costs to that of the late 1970s, taxpayers would save
49
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http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/downloadFile.do?id=357.
51

52

Ibid.

Andrew J. Coulson, Market Education: The Unknown History, (Transaction Publishers:
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approximately $2.5 billion dollars annually. The market signals created by a state tuition
tax credit system would help reach such goals.
Education Competition vs. Unions
Teacher unions are a component of public education, the negative effects of
which can be alleviated by a state tuition tax credit system. In a recently published issue
brief, James Sherk of The Heritage Foundation puts forth five reasons why unions
suffocate state budgets and frustrate government employees.53 First, unions inflate costs
for state governments by diverting money from other budgeting needs to wage
increases,54 including pensions, which have skyrocketed in states with collective
bargaining. States currently face between $1 billion and $4 billion in unfunded pension
liabilities,55 resulting in the crowding out of other important government priorities.56
Sherk notes that increased pension costs have forced San Bernadino and Vallejo,
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Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 323–364, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7915.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013).
While overall budget costs do not always increase, this study found that expenses are diverted
from other valuable areas in the context of collective bargaining.
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Ibid., citing The Pew Center on the States, “The Widening Gap Update,” Issue Brief,
June 2012, http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf
(accessed 3/4/2013); see also Andrew G. Biggs, “Public Sector Pensions: How Well Funded Are
They, Really?” State Budget Solutions, July 2012,
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf (accessed
January 24, 2013); see also Sarah F. Anzia and Terry M. Moe, “Public Sector Unions and the
Costs of Government,” American Political Science Association 2012 Annual Meeting Paper,
August, 2012, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107862, finding that a 10% increase in union
membership resulted in $1,400 increased state pension liability per-capita.
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Ibid., citing Governor Pat Quinn (D–IL), who highlighted this result with a Web video
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H62W9iLfKv4&feature=plcp (accessed January 24, 2013).
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California, to declare bankruptcy, and induced Illinois to increase its state income tax by
two-thirds from just under $5 billion to $7 billion.57 Second, most unions permit union
officials to perform union duties while clocked in at their government jobs. Taxes pay for
union operations, freeing them to divert their funds to political activism.58 Third, unions
deduct dues directly from employee paychecks, a practice which results in disguised,
coerced fundraising for causes typically unsupported by these same employees.59 Fourth,
the vast majority of union officials represent a workforce that did not consent to, or
approve of, their leadership. Given these realities unions have little to no incentive to
represent their members effectively and honestly, and members have little ability to hold
their union officials accountable. Fifth, one-size-fits-all contracts are forced on all, which
disregards the differentiation of collective bargaining preferences among union
members.60
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Due to the positive effect that state tuition tax credits have on school choice,
public school union membership would decrease if it were voluntary. Budgets would be
affected positively and governments would be able to enhance labor efficiency.
Furthermore, wages will be tailored more closely to market pressures, benefitting both
educators and students.
Overall Cost and Benefit
Taxpayer dollars expended on public schooling have risen astronomically over the
last century. Andrew J. Coulson masterfully unravels education spending growth in
Market Education: The Unknown History. Coulson cites NCES figures which indicate
that national government was spending slightly more than $500 per pupil in average daily
attendance in the 1920s, with a spending increase of $7,000 per pupil in average daily
attendance in the late 1990s.61 This amounts to a government expenditure of fourteen
times more per pupil for public education at the end of the twentieth century. According
to Coulson, explanations for the spending growth fall into two categories: first, some
argue for the necessity of increased spending based on the nature and value of school
programs, and second, some dispute the spending growth itself.62 Both of these
explanations are lacking in substance.
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Some increases in spending have been attributed to building and maintenance.
Nevertheless: capital outlays fell from 14.8% in 1919-20 to 9.3% in 1992-93.63 Others
speculate that inflation should be calculated differently for education than for other
industries. This theory’s main proponents, Richard Rothstein and Karen Miles, argue that
because education is labor-intensive and because labor costs can rise faster than the
average rate of inflation, education spending should be compared to other labor-intensive
industries.64 Rothstein and Miles modified the special inflation index for the service
sector as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but the difference between the two
indices amounts to only 0.2% in actual spending growth between 1982 and 1991. The
new index explains less than 2% of the growth in public school spending.65 Furthermore,
Coulson concludes that public school spending growth may be even higher than indicated
above. If the CPI overstates inflation to be between 0.5% and 1.5% annually, a position
taken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
public school spending growth could be understated by as much as one-and-a-half to
three times.66 Given this, public education spending might have grown twenty-one to
forty-two times since 1919-20.67
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Teacher salary increases are an additional explanation for spending growth.
Inflation-adjusted teacher salaries have increased by approximately one-and-a-half times
between 1949-50 and 1989-90.68 Growth in public education staffing has also increased
exponentially relative to student enrollment. The Heritage Foundation cites NCES
statistics that show student enrollment has increased 8% since the 1970s, while teaching
staff has increased 60%, and non-teaching staff, 138%.69 This report finds that more
teachers are instructing fewer students now than at any point in American history, with
no data indicating that student achievement increased as a result.
An additional metric to consider relative to school spending is the number of
teachers as a percentage of school staff. Since 2000, this percentage has declined by
nearly 3%, 16.5% since 1970, and 28% since 1950.70 The administrative bloat created by
a bureaucracy of administrators in the public school system cannot be overstated, nor can
it be justified given that student performance has not increased proportionally.
The state tuition tax credit program instituted in Arizona in 1997 has resulted in
decreased education costs on the part of the state, and increased benefits. In sixteen years
scholarships totaling $501 million have been dispensed through the program.71 A report
published by the Goldwater Institute in 2003 found that in its first year of operation,

68

Ibid., 206. Increases in teacher salaries went from $19,000 per year to $38,000 per year.

69

Lindsey Burke, “How Education Spending is Killing Crucial Reforms,” Heritage
Backgrounder #2739. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/how-escalatingeducation-spending-is-killing-crucial-reform (accessed 3/4/2013).
70

71

Ibid.

Private School Tuition Organization Income Tax Credits in Arizona: A Summary of
Activity, 3.
http://www.azdor.gov/Portals/0/Reports/FY2012%20private%20schl%20tuition%20org%20crdt
%20rept.pdf. Accessed 3/4/2013 (accessed 3/4/2013).
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4,248 donors received the scholarship tax credit, and after four years, participation rose to
50,000 individual donors.72 Reports published by the Arizona Department of Revenue
indicate that growth has continued to the present day; in 2012, 76,751 individuals
contributed to the state tuition tax credit program. Furthermore, 90.8% of the scholarships
dispensed have come from individual contributions, indicating an extremely high
participation rate and corresponding high interest among individual families.73 The
Goldwater Institute report supports this conclusion: “The amount of participation
demonstrates a high level of awareness of and commitment to the program among
taxpayers. It is particularly notable given the economic downturn in 2001.”74 While
students who attend private schools and utilize the scholarship tax credit are technically a
loss on the state budget, state and localities in Arizona saved $4,715 per child who
switched to private education.75
Nationwide public education spending has increased exponentially since its
inception. The public education system lacks incentives to increase education efficiency
and academic performance, and is insulated from market forces. A state tuition tax credit
system would remedy these expenditure and performance issues and provide needed
assistance to already stretched state and federal budgets.
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE TUITION TAX CREDIT PROGRAMS
Critics of state tuition tax credit programs attempt to leverage many arguments
against the free market’s effect on education. There are three mainstream arguments
against school choice policy options at large and state tuition tax credits in particular.
The first is the claim that poor parents from the inner cities of America are
incapable of making beneficial educational decisions for their children. In Market
Education, Coulson cites two important studies which counter this criticism. The first
indicates that poor and wealthy Catholic-school parents in Washington, D.C. rank
“academic program” as the key reason for choosing independent schools.76 The second,
broader study demonstrates that the poorest families were more likely to rate academics
as “very important” when compared to the wealthiest families.77 If poor families in the
inner-cities of America were given the opportunity to send their children to the school of
their choice, they would tend to choose schools with high academic standards.78 While
state tuition tax credits assist parents of all economic strata, those who would benefit
from the program more are low-income families. Tax credits can and often do make the
difference between choosing a private school over a public school. Furthermore, the state
76
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tuition tax credit program implemented in Arizona is non-means-tested, and has been
shown to disproportionately assist low-income students.79 The evidence indicates the
opposite of the charges made by critics: parents from low-income economic strata in
inner cities value school choice and leverage their ability to choose when given the
option. State tuition tax credits can provide them that option.
Racial segregation is another weapon critics attempt to wield against state tuition
tax credits, as many are presumptively skeptical of public choice options and their alleged
impact on racial segregation. The Washington, D.C. study referenced above found that
while both whites and African Americans cited academic program as their first reason for
choosing Catholic schools, the percentage of African Americans ranking academic
program first was higher than whites: 55.8% as opposed to 47.0%.80 Andrew J. Coulson
cites two persuasive reasons that should convince critics of the value of state tuition tax
credits in regards to racial diversity. First, “private schools have been no more of a refuge
for opponents of integration than have suburban public schools,” and second, private
schools have developed into institutions that are just as racially integrated as public
schools, if not more so.81 As to the first argument, public school integration did not result
in increased segregation in private schools. When white flight was at its highest, private
school enrollment actually decreased by 17%, indicating that those opposed to integration
in public schools were not using private school choice as their alternative method of
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education.82 Furthermore, Coulson finds that income is a more accurate explanation of
flight from urban schools than is race.83 As to the second argument, a statistical
comparison conducted over the last forty years shows that just prior to the 1970s, 93% of
independent school students were non-Hispanic whites, 3.6% were African Americans,
and 3.3% were other racial or ethnic groups. The percentage of African Americans in
independent schools nearly tripled to 9.1% thirty years later, approximating the
proportion of African Americans in the population at large (12.6%).84 What is needed is a
study that investigates the “extent to which minority and white students share the same
schools and classrooms.”
A study by James Coleman, which Coulson cites, found that by the early 1980s,
the least integrated schools were non-Catholic independent schools followed by Catholic
schools.85 The most racially segregated schools were public schools. This evidence
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indicates that a state tuition tax credit program would not hinder progress made in racial
integration in education, and instead would promote school choice and private school
enrollment at large, the most effective way to integrate racially. The evidence also
indicates that leaving public schools to themselves is akin to resigning future integration
aspirations and possibly losing ground already made.
Lastly, critics argue that state tuition tax credit programs will cost more than
public schools comparatively. Nevertheless, on average, independent schools cost half as
much as average public schools.86 Furthermore, economies of scale favor private schools,
particularly Catholic schools. Increasing enrollment has been shown to decrease tuition
for Catholic schools, while increasing enrollment in public schools increases per-pupil
expenditures.87
CONCLUSION
The array of benefits offered by school choice options make education policy
considerations relevant for any state. Among such competing options, state tuition tax
credits make a persuasive case. State tuition tax credits work with free market pressures
which enhance the education marketplace, and improve student achievement, student
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graduation rates, and overall performance in education. Increased parental choice also
demonstrates positive outcomes. Implementing a state tuition tax credit program would
lessen the strain on state budgets and loosen the grip teachers’ unions have on
government expenditures. Opponents of state tuition tax credits are left with little
ammunition against urban families’ education decision-making, racial integration, and
overall cost comparisons. Given their current popularity in 11 states, and the positive
momentum behind the national school choice movement, the remaining 39 states should
adopt a state tuition tax credit system.
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